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 Given the recent ascent of immigration issues to the forefront of American 
political discourse, this investigation attempts to identify the economic factors that 
determine whether an individual will favor more liberal or conservative immigration 
policies in the United States. This investigation follows the lead of previous literature in 
this area by employing a series of probit models in order to evaluate how varying 
economic and social indicators affect the probability that an individual will favor more 
liberal or conservative immigration policies. However, unlike previous works in this 
body of literature, this paper explores a pooled cross-section data set that spans over 
twenty years of survey respondents. This more expansive data set allows for the 
exploration of shifts in American attitudes over time, an area which has previously been 
underexplored. Ultimately, this investigation demonstrates that in addition to key social 
factors, such as age, race, and education, time is also a key determinant of immigration 
policy attitudes, with more recent respondents demonstrating far more liberal attitudes 
towards immigration policies than respondents from older survey years.  
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1. Introduction 
 1.1: Background 
 As one of the oldest forms of globalization, immigration has consistently 
garnered significant attention from economists who continue to take interest in its 
effects on a myriad of economic outcomes, including labor market outcomes in the 
destination country, access to public goods by both natives and immigrants, and crime 
rates. This interest in the effects of immigration is particularly relevant in the United 
States, whose immigrant population, since 1900, has consistently numbered above ten 
million, making up between five and fifteen percent of the entire population at any 
given time.1 While this large immigrant population has garnered the United States the 
distinction of being a ‘melting pot’ and a ‘nation of immigrants,’ it has also led to 
domestic strife, inciting anti-immigrant attitudes which have historically manifested 
themselves as harsh rhetoric and outright violence against immigrants into the United 
States.  
 While opposition to immigration into the United States has been an omnipresent 
aspect of American history and has affected immigrants of all racial, religious and 
ethnic backgrounds, the recent rise in nationalist ideologies to the forefront of American 
politics has brought issues surrounding immigration into the forefront of the political 
discussion. President Trump’s campaign promises to build a wall between the United 
States and Mexico, re-examine immigration policies, and push back on international 
agreements, such as NAFTA, represent the ideologies of an increasingly vocal sect of 
                                                          
1 Migration Policy Institute. “U.S. Immigrant Population and Share over Time, 1850-Present.” 
migrationpolicy.org. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/immigrant-population-
over-time (accessed April 19, 2017). 
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the United States population that is in staunch opposition to all forms of globalization.2 
This investigation is in many ways a response to this rise in anti-globalization 
sentiments, as it seeks to examine what factors cause individuals to form preferences for 
or against immigration – one particular type of globalization. While the presence of 
cultural and racial attitudes must be accounted for within the scope of this investigation, 
I will primarily be examining the economic factors that contribute to the formation of 
preferences for or against immigration, as these have come to become some of the 
major talking points for individuals in and around the Trump administration. This is 
apparent upon the examination of the rhetoric of Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who, 
in addition to garnering notoriety for his staunch opposition to illegal immigration, has 
also advocated for the reduction of legal immigrants into the United States, citing the 
fact that American workers are facing unemployment rates greater than their foreign 
counterparts who have come into the United States to live and work.3 While this sort of 
statement is contested among economists, it represents the prevailing viewpoint that has 
come to the forefront of the political sphere under the Trump administration. 
The purpose of this investigation is not to attempt to verify or disprove the views 
of anti-globalization politicians. Though there exists a significant body of literature 
examining whether the actual effects of immigration disadvantage the American 
worker, that will not be discussed at length here. Rather, this investigation will attempt 
                                                          
2 Katie Allen, “Trump's Economic Policies: Protectionism, Low Taxes and Coal Mines,” The Guardian, 
November 9, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/trumps-economic-policies-
protectionism-low-taxes-and-coal-mines/ (Accessed April 22, 2017) 
 
3 “Jeff Sessions Takes Strong Anti-Immigration Views to Justice Department.” Narrated by Robert 
Siegel. All Things Considered. National Public Radio, February 9, 2017. 
http://www.npr.org/2017/02/09/514365597/jeff-sessions-takes-strong-anti-immigration-views-to-justice-
department. 
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to explain the widespread opposition to immigration and determine what factors are the 
most significant predictors of whether an individual will be against, or in support of 
reduced immigration into the United States. It is important to note that there has been a 
great deal of work done examining the effects of and attitudes towards specifically legal 
or illegal immigration. However, the data I will be incorporating in this investigation 
does explicitly refer to either legal or illegal immigration in the way that the question is 
framed. As such, any reference to immigration in this paper will likely be made based 
on respondents whose interpretations of the question was slightly varied. Ultimately, the 
goal of this investigation is to contribute to the body of literature on immigration policy 
preferences by incorporating the most up to date data and a wide array of explanatory 
theories. In doing this, my contributions have the potential to influence better informed 
immigration policy outcomes.  
1.2:Methodology 
This paper will draw on past works that have used short term or cross-sectional 
analysis of varying surveys in varying years to examine the probability that an 
individual is in support of or opposed to decreases in immigration into the United 
States. In a similar fashion to previous works, this investigation will employ a probit 
model to explore the probabilistic relationships between economic and social 
characteristics and the probability that an individual favors restrictive immigration 
policy. In order to differentiate this investigation, I will employ a long-term sample 
from a previously underutilized survey. Additionally, this investigation will explore 
previously unexplored variables, such as whether exposure to imports plays a role in 
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shaping policy attitudes, or whether we can observe time-dependent variation in 
attitudes. 
1.3: Implications and Structure 
This paper will attempt to provide new contributions to the existing literature by 
exploring the significance of varying economic and social characteristics on the 
probability that an individual will favor more restrictive immigration policy. By 
incorporating varying models and strategies that have been employed in a host of 
different papers and concentrating them to study a long-term pooled cross-sectional data 
set, this investigation hopes to provide a highly comprehensive look at the findings 
presented in the current body of literature. This investigation will begin with an 
exploration into the body of literature that exists on this topic as well as a discussion of 
each of the primary economic theories that will be explored in this paper. Following 
that, this investigation will examine the variables used throughout this investigation and 
how they have been constructed and discuss in further depth the regression techniques 
that will be used in order to explore the determinants of individual immigration policy 
preferences. Finally, the investigation will conclude with a discussion of the results of 
the regressions and a discussion of the primary conclusions that can be reached as a 
result. 
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2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
In order to determine how individuals form preferences about immigration, this 
investigation will draw from several economic theories that exist, which predict how 
individuals should be affected by immigration given their personal, demographic, and 
economic characteristics. This section will examine these theories and, under the 
assumption that an individual will form preferences towards immigration based on their 
own economic self-interest, discuss how each theory predicts an individual should 
respond. Additionally, this section will also address the influence of noneconomic 
factors in the formation of preferences, which has been a central component of the 
existing research examining the determinants of individual attitudes toward 
immigration. 
2.1: Factor-Proportions Analysis (FPA) Model 
 The first theory under consideration, and the one most commonly described in 
the literature and the political sphere, is the Factor-Proportions Analysis Model (FPA). 
The FPA model assumes a fixed national output that employs both relatively skilled and 
unskilled workers. As Scheve and Slaughter (2001) contend in their discussion of the 
model, this implies that an influx of skilled (unskilled) labor through immigration will 
lower the relative wage of skilled (unskilled) labor in the host country.4 This occurs due 
to the fact that, since national output is fixed, there is a specific amount of skilled and 
unskilled workers required in order to fulfill the production of a country’s output. Thus, 
an increase in the relative supply of either type of labor will lower the relative wage of 
that type of labor. The direct hypothesis of this theory holds fairly straightforward 
                                                          
4 Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences 
Over Immigration Policy,” Review of Economics and Statistics 83, no. 1 (February 2001): 133–45. 
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implications for the expected formation of individual preferences towards immigration, 
suggesting that relatively low-skilled (high skilled) workers should oppose immigration 
if the immigrants are also primarily low-skilled (high-skilled) and support immigration 
if the immigrants are relatively high-skilled (low-skilled), as similarly skilled 
immigrants will drive down the relative wage of natives while oppositely skilled 
immigrants will place upward pressure on the relative wages of natives. 
The influence of this model on the formation of preferences has been tested in 
numerous papers that have yielded strikingly different results. Scheve and Slaughter 
(2001) assume that, given the recent trend of relatively unskilled immigrants entering 
the United States, survey respondents will work under the assumption that immigrants 
into the United States are relatively unskilled. This paper will utilize this assumption 
throughout the investigation as well. Under this assumption and using education level as 
a measure of skill level, Scheve and Slaughter find a strong, positive correlation 
between education level and preference for increased immigration, suggesting that 
individuals do take short term labor market outcomes into their formation of attitudes 
towards immigration.5 In addition to Scheve and Slaughter, Espenenshade and 
Hempstead (1996) have also concluded that skill level is a significant determinant of an 
individual’s attitude towards immigration, suggesting that the individual preferences are 
in fact shaped by the results of the Factor-Proportions Analysis Model.6 However, more 
recent papers have brought into question the results of these papers, suggesting that the 
demographic effects of education levels need be more effectively controlled for. 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
6Thomas J. Espenshade and Katherine Hempstead, “Contemporary American Attitudes Towards US 
Immigration,” The International Migration Review 30, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 535–70. 
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Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010), as well as Facchini and Mayda (2009) have both 
suggested that while labor market outcomes may still be relevant aspects of the 
decision-making process, they have been distorted in the data due to insufficient 
controls for noneconomic factors as well as the failure to incorporate other major 
economic models that predict different outcomes.7, 8 
2.2: Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) Model: 
 The Heckscher-Ohlin Model (HO) of international trade is extremely similar to 
the Factor-Proportions Analysis model except for a few key features. It also describes 
an economy with two factors of production, which in this case are low and high skilled 
workers, but rather than assume a fixed national output, the HO model predicts that in 
the long run, as a result of international trade, countries may adjust their national output 
to match their relative supply of each input. This implies that unless a country’s supply 
has a direct effect on world price (In the context of this model, this is called being a 
“large” country), the shift in labor supply will not result in long term wage effects.9 
Conversely, if the country is large, its effects will mirror those predicted by the Factor-
Proportions Analysis Model. This model has not been explored extensively in the scope 
of the literature, as it is difficult to analyze, given that if individuals are making 
decisions based off of this model, then the coefficient relating immigration preferences 
to skill level will be statistically insignificant if the country is small, and similar to the 
                                                          
7Jens Hainmueller and Michael J Hiscox, “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: 
Evidence from a Survey Experiment,” The American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 
2010): 61–84. 
8 Anna Maria Mayda and Giovanni Facchini, “Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes Toward 
Immigrants? Evidence Across Countries,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 91, no. 2 (2009): 295–
314. 
9 Scheve and Slaughter, “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration 
Policy.” 
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Factor-Proportions Analysis Model if the country is large. Thus, while it is important to 
recognize the presence of the HO model in the discussion of this theoretical 
background, this paper will not be directly testing for it in the data. 
2.3: Area Analysis Model: 
Another variation on the FPA Model that will be incorporated into this 
investigation is the Area Analysis Model. The Area Analysis Model is identical to the 
FPA Model in its specifications, except that it assumes several local labor markets 
rather than a single national one, with “gateway communities” carrying more 
pronounced effects of immigration.10 Gateway communities are defined as regions 
where immigrants are more highly concentrated than in the rest of the country. Thus, 
per this theory, counties with higher populations of immigrants will experience a 
stronger formation of attitudes towards immigration than counties with low levels of 
immigration. Though Hainmuller and Hiscox (2010) have tested this theory and don’t 
find support of it in their investigation, it represents an avenue of investigation that this 
paper will be testing a variation of.11 
2.4: Fiscal Burden (FB) Model: 
The Fiscal Burden (FB) Model, described and tested in the works of 
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010), Facchini and Mayda (2009), and Hanson, Scheve and 
Slaughter (2007), assumes that low skill immigrants will tend to be net consumers of 
public goods, such as welfare and public services, while high skill immigrants will be 
                                                          
10 Hainmueller and Hiscox, “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence 
from a Survey Experiment.” 
11 Ibid. 
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net contributors, paying more in taxes than they consume in public goods.12, 13, 14 Thus, 
an increase in the number of low-skilled immigrants- assuming that the government will 
respond to a shortage in revenue by increasing taxes, rather than reducing its 
expenditure on welfare and public goods- will result in increased taxes, placing the 
biggest burden on high-skilled natives, who will be left to pay for much of the shortfalls 
in public revenue that come about as a result of this budget deficit. Similarly, an 
increase in high-skilled immigration will result in the reduction of taxes which will in 
fact benefit both low and high skilled natives, with high-skilled natives being the most 
benefitted. 
Based on the hypotheses of the Fiscal Burden Model, high skill natives should 
strongly oppose the increase of low skill immigrants under the assumption that the 
government will solve the revenue shortage by increasing tax rates. Conversely, low 
skill natives will more staunchly oppose low skill immigration under the assumption 
that the government will solve its revenue shortage through cutting its provision of 
public goods. These three papers by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010), Facchini and 
Mayda (2009), and Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2007), have expressed their findings 
that the fiscal burden model, particularly the fiscal burden model with the assumption 
that the wealthy will be left to bear the financial brunt of immigration, is a highly 
relevant determinant of individual attitudes towards immigration policy.  
  
                                                          
12Ibid. 
13 Mayda and Facchini, “Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants? 
Evidence Across Countries.” 
14 Kenneth F. Scheve, Matthew J. Slaughter, and Gordon H. Hanson, “Public Finance and Individual 
Preferences Over Globalization Strategies,” Economics and Politics 19, no. 1 (March 2007): 1–33. 
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2.5: Noneconomic Factors: 
 The treatment of non-economic variables is an aspect of the investigations that 
varied greatly across studies, with authors such as Citrin et al (1997) and Espenshade 
and Hempstead (1996) emphasizing their predictive effects.15 16 This paper will be 
controlling for factors such as political affiliation, race, and age in this investigation. 
Though the treatment of these types of variables varies between papers, there is 
consensus in the belief that the incorporation of some type of demographic controls are 
needed to fully explore this type of question. Though this paper does not have data 
concerning racial biases, it is interesting to note that Dustmann and Preston managed to 
demonstrate the effects of racial bias by asking questions regarding immigrants from 
specific countries, and found that individual support of immigration was strongly 
correlated with the origin country of the immigrants.17 By controlling for each of these 
variables, I will be able to determine the relevance of these demographic factors in 
shaping how individuals form preferences toward immigration outside of the realm of 
purely economic considerations. 
2.6: Additional Hypotheses: 
 In addition to the predictions of the economic theories that have been presented, this 
paper will add to the debate several new insights regarding possible factors that may 
influence respondents’ attitudes towards immigration: 
                                                          
15 Jack Citrin et al., “Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations,” 
The Journal of Politics 59, no. 3 (August 1997): 858–81. 
16 Espenshade and Hempstead, “Contemporary American Attitudes Towards US Immigration.” 
17 Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston, “Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration,” B E 
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 7, no. 1 (2007): 1–39. 
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i). Exposure to macroeconomic shocks: Large events, such as 9/11, or the 
financial crisis, are likely to foster protectionist sentiments among respondents. By 
including time fixed effects, this paper will capture general trends in the economy as a 
whole towards immigration. This will allow for investigation of the evolution of trends 
over time and identify any significant changes, particularly in periods following 
significant events, that may shape how individuals think about globalization, and by 
extension, immigration.  
ii). Rapid pace of globalization: The incorporation of more specialized metrics 
that determine how susceptible various industries are to offshoring and to import 
competition also seems relevant to this investigation. Both of these measures of 
different types of globalization should be significant determinants of immigration 
preferences. This paper claims that it would follow that individuals whose jobs are 
likely to be taken by other forms of globalization are more likely to oppose 
immigration, as it represents another type of globalization through which their 
livelihood could be damaged. This investigation expects this hypothesis to play a more 
prominent role in recent years given the rapid growth of China as an expanding power 
in the global economy. To that end, this investigation will incorporate data that looks 
directly at whether the individual respondents live in a state that has been heavily 
inundated with Chinese imports in a particular year. The reasoning is that individuals in 
states that have been disproportionately affected by a hot button import issue, such as 
Chinese imports, will have stronger opinions surrounding globalization and by 
extension, immigration. 
12 
 
Ultimately, the lack of consensus surrounding the relative importance of 
determinants of immigration policy preferences in the literature comes from the 
variability in models and assumptions that differ so sharply between papers. As such, 
this paper will attempt to add to the existing body of literature by testing several of the 
previously described economic models with a single dataset. In addition to 
incorporating these economic theories into a single investigation, this paper will be 
adding to the literature in three distinct ways. The first of these is incorporating a pooled 
cross-section dataset that is significantly larger than any other investigations on this 
subject up to this point. In addition to an increased number of respondents, this data will 
also cover a large number of years, with the first respondents from 1996 up through the 
most recent GSS data release from 2016. As described in the discussion of other 
hypotheses, this investigation will also be incorporating year dummies into the model in 
order to examine if there are any macroeconomic trends in immigration attitudes that 
can be observed over this twenty-year period. Finally, this paper will include a metric to 
account for the susceptibility of each respondent’s occupation to globalization in order 
to provide a more appropriate measure of how individuals form preferences based on 
perceived labor market outcomes at the individual level. By doing each of these things, 
this investigation will attempt to contribute to what is already a very developed body of 
literature by exploring multiple theories in a single investigation.  
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3. Data 
3.1: Datasets in the Literature 
Discerning individual attitudes can be a difficult and inexact process, with the 
most successful papers in this particular body of literature all relying on survey data to 
provide direct indicators on individual preferences regarding immigration. The nature of 
these surveys varies greatly across studies however, with different surveys providing 
different insights into various facets of immigration attitudes. One of the most notable 
surveys referenced in the literature is the American National Election Survey (ANES), 
used by Hanson Scheve and Slaughter (2007), Citrin et al (1997), and Scheve and 
Slaughter (2001).18, 19, 20 All three of these papers have been highly influential in the 
development of the subfield and opt to use ANES data because of the wide array of 
information it provides on top of direct attitudes towards immigration. This includes not 
only demographic factors such as race, gender and income, but also attitudes towards 
the economy as a whole, various racial groups, and political parties. By including these 
variables in the analysis, these authors are more readily able to control for noneconomic 
variables that may hold influence in determining attitudes towards immigration, 
exhibiting the benefits of the ANES dataset. 
 There are other datasets which have featured prominently in multiple works 
within the body of literature. One of the most notable attributes of some of these 
surveys that provides a new element to the analysis is distinguishing between the types 
                                                          
18 Scheve, Slaughter, and Hanson, “Public Finance and Individual Preferences Over Globalization 
Strategies.” 
19Scheve and Slaughter, “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration 
Policy.” 
20 Citrin et al., “Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations.” 
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of immigrant entering the country, whether by country of origin or by relative skill 
level. The British Social Attitudes Survey, and the Cognitive Styles Survey, used by 
Dustmann and Preston (2007), and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) respectively, allow 
for a more precise analysis of the effects determining the formation of attitudes towards 
immigration policy because it allows for the assumption that all respondents are 
thinking of low skilled immigration to be relaxed.21, 22 Additionally, the International 
Social Survey Program and World Value Survey, used in Mayda’s works, distinguish 
attitudes towards trade and immigration across countries, providing a new element to 
the analysis of the formation of immigration preferences by controlling for 
nationality.23, 24 Ultimately, each of the surveys used throughout these works has 
characteristics that give them an advantage over other surveys in some areas, while 
being weaker in others. The selection of which surveys to investigate was largely 
dependent on the type of relationship that each author was trying to test. 
3.2: Data in this Investigation 
 This investigation will break from the body of literature and use General Social 
Survey (GSS) data for a number of reasons. First and foremost, this dataset is extremely 
valuable due to the fact that it has been administered consistently for decades, with 
recent surveys being conducted on a bi-yearly basis. While this is true of many other 
national and international surveys, GSS is unique in that it has kept the phrasing of its 
question regarding immigration preferences consistent over that time period as well. 
                                                          
21 Dustmann and Preston, “Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration.” 
22 Hainmueller and Hiscox, “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence 
from a Survey Experiment.” 
23 Mayda, “Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward 
Immigrants.” 
24 Mayda and Facchini, “Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants? 
Evidence Across Countries.” 
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This question reads “Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays 
should be…” with answers “1. Increased a lot” “2. Increased a little.” “3. Remain the 
same as it is.” “4. Reduced a little.” “5. Reduced a lot.” The continuity in this question 
and answer not only provides direct insight into an individual’s attitudes towards the 
number of immigrants being admitted into the United States, but also allows for a large 
pooled cross-sectional analysis, whereby survey respondents from different years are all 
incorporated into the same regression with dummy variables included for each survey 
year in order to capture any nationwide trends in attitudes towards immigration that 
may have been present in a particular year. This technique is particularly relevant in the 
scope of this investigation, as it will capture any sort of shift in the nationwide attitude 
towards immigration in the past twenty years. 
 In addition to the continuity of the question establishing preferences on the level 
of immigration into the United States, the GSS has also consistently reported key 
demographic variables over the past twenty-six years. These variables include racial 
identity, fixed income, county of residence, age, education level, occupation, and 
political preferences, among others.  
 In addition to GSS data, this investigation will also incorporate other datasets 
in order to provide a more nuanced investigation into the factors shaping American 
attitudes towards immigration. This includes a metric that will address the import 
penetration of Chinese imports into an individual’s state of residence and 
susceptibility to offshoring of an individual’s particular occupation. The former will 
be constructed utilizing US Census import data which specifies the amount of 
imports coming to each state from China in each survey year, starting in 2008. The 
16 
 
latter will be constructed using data from O*Net, which describes and scores the 
prevalence and importance of various skills in conducting each of the occupations 
described in the United States Census. This paper will use this data in a manner 
parallel to Oldenski and Raunch (2011) by using the score for “making decisions and 
solving problems” as a proxy for complexity and hence, offshorability. As discussed 
in the hypothesis section, an individual whose occupation is highly susceptible to 
these forms of globalization is more likely to oppose policies which take a more 
liberal stance toward the acceptance of globalization. This analysis also includes a 
metric described by Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) that assesses whether an 
individual’s tax rate or access to public goods is likely to be heavily affected by the 
effect of an inflow of immigrants. Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter do this by 
measuring which states lie above the mean taken from all states in terms of the 
percentage of population that are immigrants, (based on US Census data), and which 
states lie above the “national median in terms of state spending on public assistance 
per native, as measured by the US Census of Governments.”25 By including this 
variable, this investigation will assess whether individuals are making their decision 
in line with the predictions of the fiscal burden model. 
 
 
  
                                                          
25 Scheve, Slaughter, and Hanson, “Public Finance and Individual Preferences Over Globalization 
Strategies.” 
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4. Econometric Analysis 
4.1: Regression Analysis 
In this investigation, as in the bulk of the existing literature on this topic, I will 
use a probit model to gauge the explanatory effects of the presented variables on the 
probability that an individual will be in favor of enacting more restrictive immigration 
policy. The unit of observation in this investigation is an individual surveyed in a 
particular year, who lives in a particular county, and works a particular occupation. 
Within the regression, each individual respondent will be indexed by i, the county that 
each individual lives in will be indexed by l, the year the individual was questioned will 
be indexed by t, and the individual’s occupation will be denoted by k. A full description 
of each of the variables present in this investigation can be found in Table 1 of the 
Appendices. The following is an example of the regression model that I will be using 
throughout this investigation. Though I will be using various sets of explanatory 
variables throughout the construction of these regressions, all variables under 
investigation are included within the following regression model. 
 
 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ++𝛽𝛽5𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦_𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏_𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽10ℎ𝑦𝑦_𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽13ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖ℎ_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤_𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽15𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
      (1) 
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By regressing the anti_immig indicator variable on all the right hand side 
variables described in the regression model, this paper can control for demographic 
factors that may account for noneconomic attitudes towards immigration levels, while 
also systematically testing for each of the economic hypotheses laid out in the 
theoretical background.  
Among the variables laid out in Table 1, several are responsible for capturing 
demographic or noneconomic factors that might play a role in determining the 
probability that an individual favors a reduction in immigration into the United States. 
Race dummy variables, including white, black, and hispanic describe how the 
individual identifies themselves. These variables are significant in explaining the 
noneconomic factors that contribute to individual decision making. Given their 
representation as a dummy variable, their corresponding coefficient describes the 
change in probability that a respondent favors reducing the number of immigrants into 
the United States given a particular racial identity.  
 Other key noneconomic variables that are included in the regression include age 
and the political ideology variables, liberal and conservative. With age, this paper is 
able to control for whether or not older individuals are more likely to favor restrictive 
immigration policies than their younger counterparts. Given that this paper has 
represented age as a continuous variable, the associated coefficient with age indicates 
the direction of the marginal change in probability that an individual favors more 
restrictive immigration. The political ideology variables, liberal and conservative, are 
an attempt to account for the fact that over the last two decades immigration has 
become a highly politicized issue that has fallen largely along partisan lines with 
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regards to the level of restrictions on immigration that an individual is in favor of. In the 
context of this investigation, it would be expected that a negative coefficient be 
associated with liberal and a positive coefficient associated with conservative. This is 
because based on the political climate in the United States over the past two decades, an 
individual identifying as politically liberal should strongly decrease the probability they 
support restrictive immigration policies, while an individual who identifies as politically 
conservative should have a significantly increased probability of supporting these types 
of policies. 
 The set of education variables included in this set of regressions serves a number 
of purposes, both economic and non-economic. It has been suggested by researchers 
such as Hainueller and Hiscox (2010)26 that college graduates as a demographic are 
more likely to be in support of immigration as a result of their exposure to differing 
thoughts and ideas through higher education. Education also serves as a valuable metric 
for estimating the skill-level of the worker, with more educated workers typically 
employed in occupations that require a higher skill level. In the context of this 
investigation, education has been divided into four dummy variables, dropout, for 
individuals who did not complete high school, hs_grad, for individuals who completed 
their high school diploma but nothing further, jc_grad, for individuals who have 
completed a two year degree, and college_grad, for individuals who have completed a 
four year degree or higher. 
                                                          
26 Hainmueller and Hiscox, “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence 
from a Survey Experiment.” 
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Within this investigation, these education variables will be valuable proxies for 
assessing the skill-level of workers and for determining the merit of theories such as 
those predicted by the FPA and Fiscal Burden models. Under the hypotheses of the FPA 
model, one would expect a negative relationship between anti_immig and college_grad, 
as highly educated, and thus highly skilled, individuals are less likely to have their jobs 
put at risk by an influx of lower skilled immigrants. In fact, as discussed in the 
description of the FPA model, we would tend to see an increase in the relative wage of 
high skilled workers due to the influx of more low-skilled workers into the economy, 
driving down the relative wages of low-skilled workers.  Thus, high-skilled workers 
should actually favor an increase in immigration, leading to the expected negative 
coefficient.  Similarly, we would expect a positive relationship between anti_immig and 
dropout and hs_grad, as individuals with less education are more inclined to oppose 
low-skilled immigration, as it would tend to put their jobs at risk and lower the relative 
wages of low-skilled workers. 
However, under the Fiscal Burden Model we would expect a different set of 
results. Under this model, highly-skilled workers are made to bear more of the tax 
burden of low-skilled immigrants, leading to an expectation that highly-skilled workers, 
characterized by belonging to the college_grad category, would actually be positively 
related to anti_immig, implying an expected positive coefficient associated with 
college_grad. Though intuitive, it would then make sense that low skilled natives 
should then have the opposite behavior and favor an increase in immigration, yielding a 
negative correlation between hs_grad and anti_immig. Given that under the Fiscal 
Burden Model, an increase in low-skill immigrants will increase taxes across the board, 
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we would still expect lower-skilled individuals to be worse off than they would be 
without the immigration, implying that under the hypotheses of the Fiscal Burden 
Model we still expect to see an opposition to immigration, but to a lower magnitude 
than the coefficient associated with the highly-skilled individuals. 
The set of year dummies included in this regression is meant to capture the 
effects of nationwide trends in attitudes towards immigration that occur as a result of 
macroeconomic trends. In particular, this investigation predicts that the variables 
year2008 and year2010 may have positive coefficients, implying a positive relationship 
with anti_immig relative to our base year, year2016. This is due to the fact that in the 
wake of a recession, individuals are more likely to harbor protectionist sentiments, 
resulting in a nationwide trend of support on the limitation of immigrants into the 
United States. This is merely one hypothesis associated with the presence of the year 
dummies, but they are also useful in characterizing larger trends in attitude that may 
also be present within the data. This will be one characteristic of the data that will be 
monitored particularly closely for possible trends. 
The FBExposure variable is designed to test whether the effects of the Fiscal 
Burden Model are amplified in states that have both high exposure to immigration and 
especially generous welfare systems. It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in states 
which have both above average levels of immigration and above average levels of 
welfare expenditures, and 0 otherwise. According to the work of Hainmueller and 
Hiscox (2007)27, this variable, when interacted with variables that indicate the skill 
level of a worker should result in an amplified magnitude, as the effects of the Fiscal 
                                                          
27 Ibid 
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Burden Model should be more amplified in regions where individuals are more heavily 
exposed to its predicted effects. As such, when interacted with skill level variables such 
as high_income or college_grad, it is expected that the coefficient will still be negative 
with a magnitude greater than that of the un-interacted skill level variable. 
This examination includes several other variables which can represent skill level 
and serve as a metric with which to test the hypotheses laid out by the Fiscal Burden 
and FPA models. This investigation includes a pair of dummy variables, low_income 
and high_income, which represent the bottom and top quartiles of respondents by 
income, respectively. Given that the low_income and high_income variables can be 
used as a proxy for low and high skilled workers respectively, we would expect 
low_income to have a positive coefficient under the FPA model and a positive 
coefficient under the Fiscal Burden model. Conversely, high_income would be expected 
to have a negative coefficient under the FPA model and a positive coefficient under the 
Fiscal Burden model.  
Another variable of interest, Complexity, is constructed using the O*Net metric 
that assigns a score from one to five based on the amount of complex decision making 
required to perform an occupation. This metric scores 1 as the least intensive and 5 as 
the most intensive. Thus, Complexity also represents an applicable proxy for skill level. 
Individuals whose occupation is at risk of being offshored due to not being highly skill-
intensive also face competition from low-skilled immigrant workers, suggesting that 
Complexity should exhibit the same characteristics as other skill variables, with a 
negative coefficient suggesting that as the skill level of an individual’s occupation 
increases they are less likely to foster anti-immigrant attitudes given the assumptions of 
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the FPA model. Under the Fiscal Burden model, we would expect a positive coefficient, 
as a high skill level should lead to increased anti-immigration attitudes, based on the 
Fiscal Burden model’s hypotheses. 
The final variable included in the regression estimations is 
logChinese_Imports_PC which denotes the log of the value of Chinese imports per 
capita into each state during each year. This investigation included this variable in an 
attempt to explore whether larger globalization trends, such as Chinese imports, a hot 
button issue, play a role in determining how individuals feel about immigration as a 
whole. Given the divisive rhetoric surrounding Chinese imports in the United States, 
this paper hypothesizes that states with a high concentration of imports from China may 
have overly hostile views on immigration solely given its role as a form of 
globalization, leading to a positive coefficient. However, this effect is not associated 
with a particular economic theory and remains a point of speculation. 
 
4.2: Summary Statistics and Regression Breakdown 
 Prior to examining the results of any regression estimation, this paper will first 
present the summary statistics and describe the manner in which this investigation will 
be breaking up the analysis. This investigation will be divided into three distinct 
regression groups in an attempt to explore several different effects that were only 
available in certain subsets of years. The set of summary statistics depicted in Table 2 
describes the set of variables that are included in the first regression that includes survey 
responses from the years 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. Given that the 
meaning of all the variables that have been included in the regression have previously 
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been established, this section will be used to describe the strengths and weaknesses of 
this set of data for its regression purposes. This set of data has the largest number of 
responses, increasing its explanatory power, yet lacks certain variables that are highly 
significant to include in trying to determine the probability that an individual will 
support more restrictive immigration policies. In fact, this size of sample is significantly 
larger than similar examination conducted in other papers. Hanson, Scheve, and 
Slaughter(2007)28, which this investigation builds off of, only worked with sample sizes 
up to 3000 observations, demonstrating how powerful a long term sample like this can 
be in capturing explanatory effects. Despite the large size of the sample, the restrictions 
on data available in 1996 provide several limitations. In particular, the lack of data to 
construct the Fiscal Burden and import variables in 1996 make trying to glean any new 
conclusions difficult. Additionally, given the high density of immigrants to the United 
States from Latin American countries, the lack of a designated Hispanic variable in the 
1996 GSS survey has the potential to be problematic, as any explanatory power that the 
Hispanic variable would have could easily be picked up by other variables, skewing the 
results. 
 As can be observed from the listed variables in Table 2, the majority are 
dummy variables taking the value of 0 or 1. Thus, the mean value of each dummy 
variable is also the percentage of the respondents who fell into that particular response 
category. Only Complexity and age broke this trend and are continuous, thus depicting 
the statistical mean of the sample with their mean values. While the 1996-2016 sample 
provides the largest time span and survey size and provides an interesting baseline for 
                                                          
28 Scheve, Slaughter, and Hanson, “Public Finance and Individual Preferences Over Globalization 
Strategies.” 
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effects captured by the progression of time, it has several inherent problems that prevent 
it from being the only period of analysis for this investigation. 
 The second set of summary statistics presented in Table 3 explore the variables 
included in the regression that will include responses in the set of years 2004, 2008, 
2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. While this set of data contains fewer respondents and 
fewer years, it makes up for this by including several variables which were not available 
for the sample that included variables from 1996 onward. In particular, this sample 
includes a variable for Hispanic respondents as well as the data necessary to construct 
the Fiscal Burden variable, one of the central economic theories this paper sought out to 
test. To motivate the importance of this, examine the .135 mean associated with the new 
hispanic variable. The fact that 13.5% of respondents identify as Hispanic speaks to the 
importance of including this variable in the investigation. Furthermore, though this 
investigation does make sacrifices in the N value, over 5000 respondents is still 
incredibly strong and dwarfs the sample size of comparable investigations. 
 The last set of variables depicted in Table 4 includes only respondents to the 
survey from the years 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. Though it again reduces the 
number of respondents, it is able to add an additional variable that was not available for 
respondents in 1996 and 2004, while still retaining a sample size of almost 5000 
respondents. Import data specifying country of origin and county of destination was 
only available from the US Census beginning in 2008, and as such can only be explored 
from 2008 onward. Though this places limitations on the number of respondents and 
years under investigation, exploring the effects of imports on immigration preferences 
presents a new opportunity for exploration.  
26 
 
Given the large dependence on demographic variables in this investigation, we 
must necessarily establish which sets of variables are strongly correlated with one 
another in an attempt to ensure that correlations are being adequately accounted for. 
These are captured in the correlation tables depicted in Table 5. One of the key 
demographic variables to investigate in this correlation table is the effect of racial 
variables on variables that would generally be considered more purely economic 
variables. Take the high_income and low_income variables as an example. From Table 
5 we can see that the low_income variable is negatively correlated with white, at -.138, 
while being positively correlated with black and hispanic, with the coefficients .1019 
and .0915 respectively. Additionally, these income variables are also heavily correlated 
with whether or not an individual has graduated from college (college_grad). The 
low_income variable is negatively correlated with college_grad with a correlation 
coefficient of -.2117, while high_income is positively correlated with college_grad, 
with a correlation coefficient of .282. What this demonstrates in particular is that the 
inclusion of multiple variables which are all highly correlated with high_income and 
low_income may provide effects that will need to be accounted for in the analysis. 
 
  
27 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 The first pair of regressions described in Table 6, while far from comprehensive, 
does provide some interesting insights into the theories that were directly addressed in 
the introduction. One of the contributions this paper sought to make to the existing body 
of literature was to explore the effects of American attitudes towards immigration over 
an extended period of time. As demonstrated in the initial regression, when we use 2016 
as the baseline year, we see positive coefficients which increase in magnitude the 
further away from 2016 the year gets. This can be observed in the first regression, 
where the coefficients begin for year1996 with .549 and decrease as the years progress 
towards 2016 with year2004 at .280, a slight jump back up in year2008 to .295, 
year2010 at .237, year2012 at .140, and year2014 at .135. When the Complexity 
variable is introduced in the second regression, we see some slight variation, but the 
general trend and, in fact, the coefficient values themselves associated with these 
variables, remain essentially unchanged. Furthermore, given that these associated year 
coefficients are significant at the 5% confidence level or better across both regressions, 
this suggests that anti-immigration perspectives are actually becoming less prevalent 
with the passage of time. When we look at the decreasing magnitude and positive signs 
associated with each of these results, it becomes clear that compared to 2016, all 
respondents in all years prior to 2016 had an increased probability of favoring more 
restrictive immigration policy, but that this increase in probability has become less 
pronounced as the years come closer to 2016.  
 Another key variable that is incorporated in the second column of this set of 
regressions depicted in Table 6 is the Complexity variable, which ranks census 
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occupations on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most intensive in complex decision 
making and 1 being the least. The incorporation of this variable produces a statistically 
significant coefficient of -.0846, demonstrating that the more complex an individual’s 
occupation is, the less likely they are to favor more restrictive immigration policy. This 
suggests that the predictions of the FPA model may in fact be an effective tool at 
predicting whether or not an individual will favor restrictive immigration policies, as 
under the predictions of the FPA model, highly skilled individuals would actually favor 
increases in immigration, as the increase in low-skill labor would drive up their relative 
wages. 
The distinct lack of significance of the income variables, high_income and 
low_income does provide some insight into whether the Fiscal Burden model provides a 
passable explanation for whether or not individuals take into account the effects of 
access to public services when they form their policy preferences regarding 
immigration. While the FBExposure variable is unavailable for this time frame, the 
insignificant negative coefficients associated with the low_income and high_income 
variables come back as expected, with low_income at -.0538 and high_income at -.0234 
in the first regression and -.0644 and -.0155 in the second. Under the assumptions of the 
Fiscal Burden model we know that high income individuals should be relatively more 
averse to increased immigration, as they will be made to bear the majority of the tax 
burden imposed by these individuals. This is corroborated by sign and magnitude of the 
results which show higher income individuals have a less negative coefficient, 
indicating a relatively smaller reduction in the probability that an individual will favor 
restrictive immigration policies. However, given the low or non-existent significance of 
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these variables, we must take the results as inconclusive, meaning we are unable to 
conclude anything regarding the significance of the Fiscal Burden Model for this 
sample. 
 Another interesting effect that can be observed in this regression set is the 
strongly negative sign associated with individuals who have completed a bachelor’s 
degree or higher. This particular effect is interesting for a number of reasons. As has 
been stated in the previous literature, by authors such as Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter, 
the effects of education are tricky to pin down, as completion of a bachelor’s degree or 
higher does tend to imply that the respondent works in an industry that tends to be high-
skill, but college educated individuals are inherently more likely to belong to wealthier 
families and be exposed to more liberal ideas during their time at university. Thus, it is 
important to incorporate demographic variables such as liberal and conservative in 
order to try and distinguish these effects. Notably, the coefficient associated with 
college_grad does drop from -.378 to -.338 after the introduction of the Complexity 
variable, suggesting that even when the effects of complexity of one’s occupation and 
income effects are included, there still exists a strong negative coefficient associated 
with college_grad, demonstrating that an individual who attended college is 
significantly less likely to support more restrictive immigration policy, even once the 
effects of income and Complexity have been corrected for. This suggests that attending 
college ought to be thought of more as a demographic effect and that it is the exposure 
to different ideas, rather than the increased earning potential that is the driving factor 
behind this effect. 
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The set of regressions described in Table 7 utilizes the set of respondents 
described in the second set of summary statistics. That is, these respondents are all from 
the years 2004, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The first thing to observe is the 
significance of coefficients of the two variables we were able to include in this model 
due to the reduced sample size. That is hispanic and FBExposed. As we see from the 
results, hispanic comes back as highly significant, indicating that there is strong 
rationale for including it in the data set in exchange for reducing the total number of 
respondents in the data set. Conversely, the FBExposed variable, designed to capture 
whether high skilled workers in states where they would be highly exposed to the 
effects of immigration are more opposed to immigration than their counterparts in lower 
exposure states, came back as insignificant, demonstrating that though skill level is 
significant in determining the probability that an individual will support restrictive 
immigration policies, it does not necessarily fall in line with the expectations of the 
Fiscal Burden Model. 
 The first observation to be made with Table 7 concerns the magnitude of the 
coefficients of the year variables in this set of regressions. Once again, we see almost no 
variation of the year coefficients between the three regressions within the set with all 
results coming back highly significant. In this set of regressions, we have year2004 
at .301, year2008 at .316, year2010 at .241, year2012 at .221, and year2014 at .157, 
with all the coefficients experiencing virtually no change when FBExposure and 
Complexity are introduced in the second and third regressions in the table. While we 
observe the same general trend within the year coefficients that we did in the first set, 
with the positive magnitudes that decrease each year, save for a slight increase in 2008, 
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the general magnitude of the coefficients in this set of regressions is reduced as 
compared to the set which included 1996. However, given the reduction in sample size, 
this does not appear too out of the ordinary and the fact that the general trend is 
maintained suggest strongly that this is a trend worth discussing further in the analysis. 
 The coefficients of the Complexity variable in Table 7 corroborate with the 
results that came out of the first set of regressions, demonstrating that individuals with 
more highly complex occupations are less likely to favor a more restrictive immigration 
policy. Though the magnitudes do not exactly line up, with the set of regressions in 
Table 7 boasting a slightly higher magnitude at -.0982 in the second regression and 
-.0965 in the third, as compared to -.0846 in Table 6, the continuity in sign and 
significance demonstrate that this effect is an important determinant of policy 
preference in both models. However, the FBExposure variable, one of the primary 
reasons to restrict the sample to this time period, comes out as insignificant, further 
diminishing the effects of the Fiscal Burden model, demonstrating that individuals who 
are more exposed to the fiscal effects of immigration are no more or less likely to favor 
restrictive immigration policy than those who are less exposed to its effects. 
 The last key variable that was introduced in this set of regression is the hispanic 
variable, which was added in an effort to capture the demographic effects of individuals 
who come from Hispanic or Latino backgrounds. The associated coefficient of -0.232 
varies only slightly in the second and third regressions and, given that the coefficients 
for hispanic_ each came back as highly significant, illustrates that individuals from 
Hispanic and Latino backgrounds are significantly less likely to support restrictive 
immigration policies. 
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 The final set of regressions in this investigation, depicted in Table 8, explores 
whether or not the prevalence of Chinese imports into the respondent’s state of 
residence has a significant effect on the probability that an individual will have stronger 
feelings for or against more restrictive immigration policies. The rationale here is that if 
individuals come from states experiencing larger amounts of other types of 
globalization, they may have stronger feelings towards immigration by extension. 
However, upon inspection of the regression results, it becomes evident that imports are 
not a major influence on the probability that an individual is in support of more 
restrictive immigration policy being adopted in the United States.  
 Further reiterating the results of Table 6 and Table 7, Table 8 also demonstrates 
that the coefficients for the year dummies come back as highly significant and 
demonstrate a pattern that is in line with the one depicted in both of the previous sets of 
regressions, with positive coefficients that decrease in magnitude the closer the years 
get to 2016. In this set of regressions, we see the first regression taking the coefficients 
for year2008 at .305, year2010 at .229, year2012 at .210, and year2014 at .145. Again, 
these coefficients remain virtually unchanged even when other variables are introduced, 
signaling that there are in fact strong time trends associated with the probability that an 
individual is in support of more restrictive immigration policy. 
 The next coefficient of interest that is important to discuss in the context of these 
results is Complexity and how its effects are changed under the new sample. While the 
magnitude and sign of Complexity do not change dramatically, as it produces a 
coefficient of -.877, similar in sign and magnitude to the results described in Tables 6 
and 7, the fact that the results no longer come back as statistically significant at the 5% 
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level is a significant change that must be considered in the analysis of these results. 
Though the FBExposed came back as statistically insignificant when it was tested in 
Table 7, it was included in Table 8 as well in order to explore whether these effects 
would change under a different sample. However, just as in Table 7, FBExposed came 
back as statistically insignificant, demonstrating the fact that exposure to the fiscal 
effects of immigration did not affect the probability that an individual would favor more 
restrictive immigration policies. 
 The last variable of interest to be introduced in the set of regressions depicted in 
Table 8 is logChinese_Imports_PC, which essentially takes the log value of Chinese 
Import per capita by state and attempts to use that as a proxy for an individual’s 
exposure to other forms of globalization. The goal is to determine whether such 
exposure may shape how an individual forms preferences regarding immigration policy. 
While the coefficients came back at .000907 in the third regression and .00199 in the 
fourth, respectively, suggesting that individuals who are more exposed to Chinese 
Imports do in fact face an increased probability of supporting more restrictive 
immigration policies, the fact that these results were insignificant, even at the 10% 
level, demonstrates that exposure to Chinese Imports does not actually affect the 
probability that an individual will form preferences in a particular way regarding 
immigration policy. 
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6. Discussion 
 This paper sought out to examine a variety of theories that have been addressed 
in the body of literature and whether these theories were viable means of predicting the 
likelihood that an individual would either be in support of or opposed to an increase in 
the levels of immigration into the United States. Additionally, it sought to demonstrate 
whether other factors, such as time, imports, or how offshorable an individual’s 
occupation was, were significant determinants. Through the exploration of a large, 
previously underexplored dataset over an extended period of time, this investigation has 
reached conclusions about the effectiveness of each of these theories and effects. 
 The primary model covered by economic theory and explored throughout the 
body of literature is the Factor-Proportions Analysis Model. According to this model we 
should see a trend where higher skilled individuals are more inclined to not oppose 
increases in immigration, under the assumption that the general perception is that the 
majority of immigrants entering the United States are going to be working low skilled 
jobs. This plays out consistently in the results section where we observe strong negative 
relationships between anti_immig and both Complexity and college_grad, respectively, 
demonstrating that highly skilled individuals are significantly less likely to be in favor 
of limiting immigration than their lower skilled counterparts. 
 The other primary economic theory that this investigation sought to examine 
was the Fiscal Burden Model. Under the Fiscal Burden model, individuals who are 
more highly skilled should oppose generally low skilled immigration, as they will be 
made to bear more of the costs associated with immigration through taxation. These 
effects are expected to be more pronounced in states where individuals are more 
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exposed to immigration and who live in states with more generous welfare programs. 
Ultimately, the effects were not borne out in the results and it would be safe to say, 
given all three sets of regressions, that the predictions of the Fiscal Burden Model does 
not significantly predict the probability that an individual will be in support of reducing 
the number of immigrants into the United States. 
 Apart from the existing theories which address how individuals are expected to 
feel about increases or decreases in immigration into the United States, this 
investigation also sought to test a number of other factors to determine whether they had 
any bearing on how individuals felt about immigration policy. The first of these was to 
test whether or not the increases in globalization over the last decades, particularly as it 
pertains to imports from China, would be a significant predictor of how individuals 
would feel about immigration policy. In both regressions in which the variable 
capturing the imports per capita of each respondents’ home state was included, the 
coefficient came back as statistically insignificant, suggesting that although 
globalization and more specifically, Chinese imports, have been a hot button topic over 
the past couple decades, their effects have not significantly swayed Americans to form 
opinions on immigration. 
 The final hypothesis this investigation sought to test concerned the effects of 
macroeconomic shocks on how probable it was for individuals to form anti-immigration 
preferences. Though specific effects such as the effects surrounding such significant 
events did not come to the forefront, there were significant results demonstrating the 
fact that, perhaps surprisingly, individual preferences towards immigration have 
become increasingly less anti-immigrant as the past two decades have progressed.  
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The strong significance of these results paired with the fact that they appear in all three 
regression sets demonstrate that as a whole, Americans have become less anti-
immigrant over the past two decades, despite what the divided rhetoric in the media 
may have one believe. 
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7. Conclusion 
Ultimately, immigration is an issue which possesses numerous social 
implications that undoubtedly appear in the results of this investigation, as we see 
factors such as political leanings, race, and immigrant families playing a large role in 
determining whether an individual will be opposed to increases in immigration into the 
United States. However, this investigation has also demonstrated strong support that the 
Factor Proportions Analysis model as an effective tool for predicting whether an 
individual will be in support of limiting immigration into the United States. 
Additionally, this investigation has also demonstrated that opinions in the United States 
have been changing over time and the average individual today is less likely to have 
anti-immigrant sentiments than an individual in the past, demonstrating a definitive shift 
in the perceptions of United States citizens as time has progressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
8. Appendices 
Table 1: 
Variable Name Description Range of Values 
anti_immig Indicates respondent thinks 
immigration should either be 
“reduced a little” or “reduced a 
lot” 
 
1: Respondent 
expressed anti-
immigration beliefs  
0: Respondent did not 
express anti-
immigration beliefs 
dropout Education dummy that 
indicates respondent did not 
graduate from high school. 
1: Respondent falls in 
this category. 
0: Respondent is not in 
this category. 
hs_grad Education dummy that 
indicates respondent’s highest 
degree is from high school. 
 
1: Respondent falls in 
this category. 
0: Respondent is not in 
this category. 
jc_grad Education dummy that 
indicates respondent achieved a 
two-year associate’s degree but 
no further degree. 
1: Respondent falls in 
this category. 
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0: Respondent is not in 
this category. 
college_grad Education dummy that 
indicates respondent achieved a 
four-year bachelor’s degree or 
further degree 
1: Respondent falls in 
this category. 
0: Respondent is not in 
this category. 
age Indicates the respondent’s age. 18-89: Respondent’s 
age 
black Indicates if the respondent 
identifies as Black. 
1: Respondent is Black 
0: Respondent is not 
Black 
hispanic_ Indicates if the respondent 
identifies as Hispanic and/or 
Latino. 
1: Respondent is 
Hispanic/Latino 
0: Respondent is not 
Hipanic/Latino 
liberal Indicates if the respondent 
views themselves as “Liberal” 
or “Extremely Liberal” on the 
political spectrum. 
1: Respondent is liberal 
0: Respondent is not 
liberal 
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conservative Indicates if the respondent 
views themselves as 
“Conservative” or “Extremely 
Conservative” on the political 
spectrum. 
1: Respondent is 
conservative 
0: Respondent is not 
conservative 
 
year A set of dummy variables 
representing each survey year 
under investigation: 
Eg) year1996, year2004 etc. 
 
1: Respondent 
interviewed in the 
indicated year. 
0: Respondent was not 
interviewed in the 
indicated year 
high_income Measures whether an individual 
was in the top quarter of fixed 
income among all respondents 
in a particular year. 
1: Respondent is in the 
top quartile 
0: Respondent is not in 
the top quartile 
low_income Measures whether an individual 
was in the bottom quarter of 
fixed income among all 
respondents in a particular year. 
1: Respondent is in the 
bottom quartile 
0: Respondent is not in 
the bottom quartile 
41 
 
FBExposure This is the variable described 
by Hanson, Scheve and 
Slaughter (2007) that will 
determine whether the 
respondent lives in a state that 
has both above average levels 
of immigrant population and of 
government expenditure on 
public assistance per resident.29 
1: The respondent does 
live in a state that meets 
these conditions. 
0: The respondent does 
not live in a state that 
meets these conditions. 
Complexity Indicates how susceptible the 
respondent’s occupational 
industry is to offshoring and 
import penetration. 
Continuous 1 to 5 scale 
with 1 being the least 
complex and 5 the 
most. 
logChinese_Imports_PC Indicates the log of Chinese 
imports per capita in the state 
of residence of the respondent 
in the year the interview was 
conducted. 
All data points exist in 
the range from 4.5 to 
8.3 in this dataset. 
 
  
                                                          
29 Scheve, Slaughter, and Hanson, “Public Finance and Individual Preferences Over Globalization 
Strategies.” 
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Table 2: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
age 7,650 47.46 16.80 18 89 
pro_immig 7,650 0.133 0.340 0 1 
year1996 7,650 0.124 0.329 0 1 
year2004 7,650 0.0931 0.291 0 1 
year2008 7,650 0.135 0.341 0 1 
year2010 7,650 0.143 0.350 0 1 
year2012 7,650 0.130 0.337 0 1 
year2014 7,650 0.178 0.382 0 1 
year2016 7,650 0.198 0.398 0 1 
anti_immig 7,650 0.499 0.500 0 1 
conservative 7,650 0.192 0.394 0 1 
liberal 7,650 0.158 0.365 0 1 
white 7,650 0.773 0.419 0 1 
black 7,650 0.144 0.351 0 1 
college_grad 7,650 0.285 0.452 0 1 
jc_grad 7,650 0.0833 0.276 0 1 
hs_grad 7,650 0.517 0.500 0 1 
dropout 7,650 0.115 0.319 0 1 
low_income 7,650 0.209 0.407 0 1 
high_income 7,650 0.231 0.421 0 1 
immigrant_parent 7,650 0.189 0.392 0 1 
Complexity 7,650 3.046 0.456 1.880 4.190 
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Table 3: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
age 5,534 47.41 16.83 18 89 
pro_immig 5,534 0.148 0.355 0 1 
year2004 5,534 0.102 0.303 0 1 
year2008 5,534 0.148 0.355 0 1 
year2010 5,534 0.163 0.370 0 1 
year2012 5,534 0.154 0.361 0 1 
year2014 5,534 0.205 0.403 0 1 
year2016 5,534 0.227 0.419 0 1 
anti_immig 5,534 0.455 0.498 0 1 
conservative 5,534 0.188 0.391 0 1 
liberal 5,534 0.169 0.374 0 1 
white 5,534 0.745 0.436 0 1 
black 5,534 0.156 0.363 0 1 
college_grad 5,534 0.310 0.463 0 1 
jc_grad 5,534 0.0853 0.279 0 1 
hs_grad 5,534 0.497 0.500 0 1 
dropout 5,534 0.107 0.310 0 1 
low_income 5,534 0.194 0.395 0 1 
high_income 5,534 0.236 0.425 0 1 
immigrant_parent 5,534 0.223 0.416 0 1 
hispanic_ 5,534 0.135 0.341 0 1 
FBExposed 5,534 0.303 0.459 0 1 
Complexity 5,534 3.061 0.460 1.880 4.190 
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Table 4: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
age 4,968 47.73 16.89 18 89 
pro_immig 4,968 0.154 0.361 0 1 
year2008 4,968 0.165 0.371 0 1 
year2010 4,968 0.182 0.386 0 1 
year2012 4,968 0.172 0.377 0 1 
year2014 4,968 0.228 0.419 0 1 
year2016 4,968 0.253 0.435 0 1 
anti_immig 4,968 0.449 0.497 0 1 
conservative 4,968 0.187 0.390 0 1 
liberal 4,968 0.174 0.379 0 1 
white 4,968 0.741 0.438 0 1 
black 4,968 0.160 0.367 0 1 
college_grad 4,968 0.311 0.463 0 1 
jc_grad 4,968 0.0841 0.278 0 1 
hs_grad 4,968 0.497 0.500 0 1 
dropout 4,968 0.108 0.311 0 1 
low_income 4,968 0.188 0.391 0 1 
high_income 4,968 0.232 0.422 0 1 
immigrant_parent 4,968 0.225 0.417 0 1 
hispanic_ 4,968 0.139 0.346 0 1 
FBExposed 4,968 0.305 0.460 0 1 
Complexity 4,968 3.059 0.461 1.880 4.190 
logChinese_Imports_PC 4,968 6.907 0.754 4.558 8.277 
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Table 5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 age anti_immig FBExposed conservative liberal white black hispanic_ college_grad 
age 1         
anti_immig 0.0862 1        
FBExposed -0.0147 -0.0661 1       
conservative 0.103 0.1221 -0.0748 1      
liberal -0.043 -0.152 0.1077 -0.22 1     
white 0.1572 0.1194 -0.0527 0.0968 -0.0482 1    
black -0.0895 -0.0393 -0.0555 -0.0677 0.0172 -0.7387 1   
hispanic_ -0.1659 -0.1287 0.1615 -0.0765 0.0004 -0.1744 -0.1246 1  
college_grad 0.047 -0.1251 0.0918 0.005 0.1113 0.1015 -0.1109 -0.1328 1 
jc_grad -0.0426 0.0251 -0.0053 0.0031 -0.0355 0.0021 0.0139 -0.0379 -0.2036 
hs_grad -0.0458 0.107 -0.0919 -0.0067 -0.0853 -0.0337 0.0851 -0.0056 -0.6675 
dropout 0.0418 -0.0082 0.016 0.0006 0.0031 -0.099 0.0158 0.2407 -0.2339 
low_income -0.0347 0.0112 -0.0093 -0.0315 0.0233 -0.138 0.1019 0.0915 -0.2117 
high_income 0.008 0.0071 0.0984 0.0466 -0.0162 0.1202 -0.123 -0.0883 0.282 
Immigrant_parent -0.0578 -0.1895 0.2105 -0.0966 0.0476 -0.2079 -0.0931 0.4839 0.0062 
Complexity 0.0927 -0.0538 0.0515 0.0503 0.0414 0.1438 -0.1387 -0.1446 0.4591 
logChinese_Import_PC -0.0243 -0.0541 0.3027 -0.0391 0.0321 -0.0542 -0.0234 0.159 0.0182 
 jc_grad hs_grad dropout low_income high_income 
Immigrant_ 
parent Complexity logChi~C 
jc_grad 1        
hs_grad -0.3012 1       
dropout -0.1055 -0.3459 1      
low_income -0.0399 0.0665 0.2443 1     
high_income 0.0036 -0.1691 -0.1513 -0.2642 1    
Immigrant_parent -0.0085 -0.1007 0.1606 0.0413 -0.0306 1   
Complexity 0.0264 -0.2842 -0.2503 -0.2716 0.2887 -0.0295 1  
logChinese_Import_PC -0.0126 -0.0388 0.0467 -0.0162 0.0307 0.1766 0.0085 1 
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Table 6: 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES anti_immig anti_immig 
   
year1996 0.549*** 0.549*** 
 (0.0573) (0.0573) 
year2004 0.280*** 0.283*** 
 (0.0611) (0.0611) 
year2008 0.295*** 0.296*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0555) 
year2010 0.238*** 0.236*** 
 (0.0545) (0.0545) 
year2012 0.152*** 0.152*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0560) 
year2014 0.138*** 0.138*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0518) 
Complexity  -0.0846** 
  (0.0384) 
high_income -0.0234 -0.0115 
 (0.0408) (0.0411) 
low_income -0.0538 -0.0644 
 (0.0419) (0.0422) 
liberal -0.389*** -0.388*** 
 (0.0427) (0.0426) 
conservative 0.182*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0389) 
age 0.00495*** 0.00513*** 
 (0.000910) (0.000914) 
white 0.292*** 0.293*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0631) 
black 0.0661 0.0603 
 (0.0724) (0.0725) 
college_grad -0.378*** -0.334*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0592) 
jc_grad 0.0138 0.0407 
 (0.0689) (0.0700) 
hs_grad 0.0247 0.0373 
 (0.0496) (0.0499) 
immigrant_parent -0.542*** -0.544*** 
 (0.0430) (0.0430) 
Constant -0.451*** -0.225 
 (0.0909) (0.138) 
   
Observations 7,650 7,650 
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Table 7: 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES anti_immig anti_immig anti_immig 
    
year2004 0.301*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0687) 
year2008 0.316*** 0.317*** 0.316*** 
 (0.0626) (0.0626) (0.0626) 
year2010 0.241*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 
 (0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0608) 
year2012 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
 (0.0617) (0.0618) (0.0618) 
year2014 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0579) (0.0579) (0.0580) 
Complexity  -0.0982** -0.0965** 
  (0.0451) (0.0454) 
ComplexityFBExposed   -0.00515 
   (0.0127) 
high_income -0.0318 -0.0178 -0.0160 
 (0.0482) (0.0486) (0.0488) 
low_income -0.0564 -0.0693 -0.0690 
 (0.0509) (0.0513) (0.0513) 
liberal -0.393*** -0.391*** -0.390*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0498) 
conservative 0.213*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0458) (0.0459) (0.0459) 
age 0.00429*** 0.00445*** 0.00446*** 
 (0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00107) 
white 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0705) (0.0706) (0.0707) 
black -0.0146 -0.0225 -0.0238 
 (0.0823) (0.0825) (0.0826) 
hispanic_ -0.232*** -0.239*** -0.237*** 
 (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0646) 
college_grad -0.409*** -0.359*** -0.358*** 
 (0.0675) (0.0714) (0.0715) 
jc_grad -0.0312 -0.00208 -0.00147 
 (0.0824) (0.0834) (0.0834) 
hs_grad -0.00289 0.0109 0.0113 
 (0.0608) (0.0611) (0.0611) 
immigrant_parent -0.450*** -0.449*** -0.447*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0522) 
Constant -0.354*** -0.0859 -0.0874 
 (0.110) (0.166) (0.166) 
    
Observations 5,534 5,534 5,534 
 
 
48 
 
Table 8: 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES anti_immig anti_immig anti_immig anti_immig 
     
year2008 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.306*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0633) (0.0638) (0.0638) 
year2010 0.229*** 0.226*** 0.230*** 0.227*** 
 (0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0615) (0.0616) 
year2012 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0625) 
year2014 0.145** 0.144** 0.145** 0.143** 
 (0.0586) (0.0587) (0.0586) (0.0587) 
Complexity  -0.0877*  -0.0877* 
  (0.0479)  (0.0479) 
ComplexityFBExposed  -0.00165  -0.00193 
  (0.0134)  (0.0139) 
high_income -0.0121 0.00108 -0.0122 0.000913 
 (0.0516) (0.0522) (0.0517) (0.0523) 
low_income -0.0332 -0.0449 -0.0332 -0.0449 
 (0.0548) (0.0552) (0.0548) (0.0552) 
liberal -0.409*** -0.407*** -0.409*** -0.407*** 
 (0.0520) (0.0522) (0.0520) (0.0522) 
conservative 0.225*** 0.228*** 0.225*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0486) (0.0485) (0.0486) 
age 0.00444*** 0.00460*** 0.00444*** 0.00460*** 
 (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113) 
white 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0743) (0.0745) (0.0743) (0.0745) 
black -0.0168 -0.0250 -0.0168 -0.0251 
 (0.0866) (0.0869) (0.0867) (0.0869) 
hispanic_ -0.214*** -0.220*** -0.214*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0678) (0.0680) (0.0680) (0.0682) 
college_grad -0.375*** -0.329*** -0.375*** -0.329*** 
 (0.0716) (0.0759) (0.0716) (0.0759) 
jc_grad -0.0302 -0.00344 -0.0302 -0.00332 
 (0.0874) (0.0885) (0.0874) (0.0885) 
hs_grad 0.0104 0.0237 0.0105 0.0238 
 (0.0645) (0.0649) (0.0645) (0.0649) 
immigrant_parent -0.449*** -0.447*** -0.449*** -0.447*** 
 (0.0549) (0.0553) (0.0551) (0.0554) 
logChinese_Imports_PC   0.000907 0.00199 
   (0.0254) (0.0264) 
Constant -0.392*** -0.152 -0.399* -0.166 
 (0.115) (0.174) (0.212) (0.254) 
     
Observations 4,968 4,968 4,968 4,968 
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